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Abstract
The DP hypothesis is said to accommodate determiners and quantiﬁers well by treating them 
as two distinct categories, but the present paper argues that this distinction is basically a semantic one, 
and as such, it is not always easy to make with any degree of accuracy. Moreover, since the distinction 
is mostly irrelevant to syntax （or at least, introductory syntax）, the paper suggests, from a pedagogi-
cal point of view, that it should be dropped in textbooks that are written for beginning syntax students, 
such as Radford 2009.
Regarding wh-questions in English, the paper points out quite a few technical problems as-
sociated with Radford’s way of deriving them, which is based on Chomsky’s Minimalist Program. 
More speciﬁcally, it is shown that the following conditions/constraints cannot be maintained: the Im-
penetrability Condition, the Interrogative Condition, the Attract Smallest Condition, and the Freezing 
Constraint. Furthermore, ad hoc nature of the edge feature is also demonstrated.
1. Introduction
This is a review article of Andrew Radford’s latest syntax textbook An Introduction to English 
Sentence Structure （henceforth, IESS） published by Cambridge University Press in 2009, which 
is an abridged version of his longer book Analyzing English Sentences also published by CUP in 
the same year. I chose this abridged version for review, since it is meant for beginning linguistics 
students, especially “students whose native language is not English, and who are taking （English） 
syntax as a minor rather than a major course” （p. ix）. Most of my students have been in this cat-
egory, and I have been using the textbook since the spring of 2010. So I now have plenty of things to 
say about the book from my own teaching experience, and I would like to share some of them here 
Transcommunication  Vol.1  2013
Graduate School of International Culture and Communication Studies
* I was blessed with quite a few excellent students in my Fundamentals of Generative Syntax class in the Fall of 2013. Some of the points 
that I raise in this article were directly inspired by their questions and comments. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the whole of 
that class, but the following students deserve special mention: Airi Ishikura, Yingjie Lan, Zhongyuan Lu, and Dan Park. I also would like 
to extend my gratitude to Masashi Harada, who too gave me interesting food for thought after carefully reading the ﬁrst draft of this article.
Kenichi Namai
16
in the form of a review article.
Radford （henceforth, R） has been known as the master of textbook writing in the ﬁeld of gen-
erative syntax since his ﬁrst syntax textbook Transformational Syntax published in 1981. His 1988 
book Transformational Grammar has helped numerous students all over the world to familiarize 
themselves with Chomskyan linguistics and is still considered a “must read” for anyone interested 
in generative syntax. IESS is good for students who want a description of a range of phenomena in 
English syntax explained by Chomsky’s Minimalist concepts and assumptions, as R himself notes. 
I have read quite a few textbooks on Minimalist syntax, but nothing comes anywhere near IESS 
in terms of clarity. R’s casual writing style is often entertaining, and even feels soothing at times – 
especially after reading extremely dense technical works written by specialists like Chomsky and 
some of his followers.
But this doesn’t mean that R’s latest work is free of problems. Since it is a book meant for 
beginning students, it shouldn’t be unnecessarily complicated, much less contradictory; however, it 
occasionally falls short in this regard. In what follows, I will present some notable examples from 
the DP Hypothesis and phenomena associated with wh-movement, and suggest alternative analy-
ses, where possible. It is my sincere hope that the reader will take into consideration the discussion 
in this article when reading IESS so that he or she will better understand recent work in syntactic 
theory.
2. DP Hypothesis
In this section, matters related to the DP hypothesis are discussed. Perhaps, it is now impos-
sible to totally ignore this hypothesis even in introductory textbooks, so ﬁnding it in IESS should 
not be so surprising. However, if one decides to teach it to beginning students, one should exercise 
extreme care, since there are still quite a few delicate issues surrounding the hypothesis. For ex-
ample, R distinguishes quantiﬁers from determiners, so while, say, the student is analyzed as a DP, 
a student is taken to be a QP in IESS. But this distinction is probably not an appropriate one for an 
introductory textbook. In what follows, I will show how so in discussing several problems associ-
ated with R’s way of handling the DP hypothesis.
2.1. Polarity Item Any
When analyzing the internal structure of a noun phrase, it has been standard to adopt the 
DP hypothesis since Abney 1987. But teaching this hypothesis to beginning linguistics students 
requires special care, since it goes directly against the intuition of most nonlinguists. Look at the 
following examples in this connection.
（1） a. the chairman
 b. any coffee
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Despite the fact that the and any are functional words devoid of lexical meaning, in the DP hypoth-
esis, they are said to head the nominal phrases in （1a） and （1b）, respectively, as shown in （2）.
（2）a.  DP    b.  QP
   D  N    Q  N 
   the chairman   any coffee
In short, （1a,b） are regarded as DP and QP, not NP.
This is hard to swallow without empirical evidence, but R seems to give only theory-internal 
evidence, namely, the fact that English is a head-ﬁrst language. Citing Klima 1964, however, he 
does present what could have been taken as empirical evidence, from the syntax of a polarity item 
any:
（3） （= R’s （44）, p. 60）
 a. I wonder how often we ﬁnd any morality in business.
 b. No student will complain about anything.
 c. If anyone should ask for me, say I’ve gone to lunch.
 d. *I’d like any coffee, please.
He writes on page 60: “… we can suppose that a polarity item such as （partitive） any is restricted to 
occurring in a structure containing an affective constituent,” where affective constituents are bold-
typed expressions in （3）. Here, R’s main aim is to show signiﬁcance of the notion of “c-command” 
in the ﬁeld of syntax, so he presents his Polarity Condition （5） after comparing the two sentences 
in （4）.
（4） （= R’s （48）, p. 61）
 a. The fact that he has resigned won’t change anything.
 b. *The fact that he won’t resign will change anything.
（5） （= R’s （49）, p. 61）
 Polarity Condition
  A polarity item must be c-commanded by an affective （e.g. negative, interrogative or 
conditional） constituent.
Notice that won’t c-commands anything in grammatical （4a）, but it fails to c-command anything in 
ungrammatical （4b）; hence, the Polarity Condition.
In order to ﬁrmly stand as a condition, however, （5） seems to need to take into consideration 
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a locality factor of some kind as well, since （6） below, in which isn’t c-commands anything, is 
nevertheless deemed ungrammatical （not so, if anything is taken as a compound noun that contains 
what R calls any with a “universal” or “free-choice” interpretation （p. 60））. The ungrammaticality 
of （6） must be due to the fact that isn’t and anything are not clausemates.1
（6） *It isn’t true that he teaches anything.
But with nominal phrases with a PP complement, this “clausemate condition” becomes ir-
relevant. And using such phrases, R could have made a case for the DP hypothesis; that is, he could 
have pointed out the fact that an affective constituent must c-command a nominal phrase headed by 
any, not a nominal phrase that merely contains it:
（7） a. She doesn’t like any students of syntax.
 b. *She doesn’t like syntax students of any persuasion.
Notice that doesn’t c-commands any in both （7a） and （7b）, but only （7a） is grammatical. （（7b） 
is grammatical if any is taken as a universal quantiﬁer; indeed, the afﬁrmative version of （7b）, She 
likes syntax students of any persuasion, is also grammatical, in contrast to ungrammatical （3d）.2） 
This difference in grammaticality couldn’t be explained if any students of syntax in （7a） were an 
NP headed by the N students.3
2.2. Null D and Q
What is tacitly assumed in section 2.1 about the DP Hypothesis is that the two categories D 
and Q are of the same type. In fact, D has long been used as an umbrella category label for both D 
and Q. Indeed, R too writes on page 4 that these two categories are related, but he still treats them 
separately. For R, D is always deﬁnite, but Q is indeﬁnite.
However, this distinction is not that straightforward. Actually, there are many cases where the 
DP/QP status of a nominal expression is very hard to determine, with the simple dichotomy of D = 
deﬁnite, and Q = indeﬁnite. Nevertheless, in IESS, this distinction is taken for granted without any 
convincing argument, causing confusion among readers. This subsection concerns itself with this 
problem.
Apparently with an intention to provide evidence for the DP Hypothesis, R ﬁrst presents the 
fact that deﬁnite nouns like proper names are accompanied by a deﬁnite determiner in Greek.
（8） （= R’s （77）, p. 108）
 O Gianis thavmazi tin Maria.
 The John admires the Mary
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       ‘John admires Mary.’
What he wants to say with （8） is that bare nominal expressions like John must also be headed by a 
deﬁnite determiner, which is always given a null spellout in English.
He then proceeds to present a coordination fact to further support this idea:
（9） （= R’s （79）, p. 109）
 John and [the chairman] are attending a meeting.
Since “expressions can only be coordinated if they belong to the same category” （p. 109）, the 
grammaticality of （9） is taken to suggest that John must be headed by a null determiner so that the 
coordination in （9） will be analyzed as [DP ø John] and [DP the chairman].
Moreover, R presents the following coordinated sentences involving quantiﬁers in order to 
argue that there must exist a null quantiﬁer, too:
（10） （= R’s （82）, p. 110）
 a. Eggs and many dairy products cause cholesterol.
 b. I’d like toast and some coffee please.
The grammaticality of these sentences is said to indicate that what are coordinated in （10a,b） are 
QPs, with eggs and toast being headed by ø, a null quantiﬁer:
（11）a. [QP ø eggs] and [QP many dairy products]
 b. [QP ø toast] and [QP some coffee]
R also argues that this null Q has exactly the same selectional properties as the overt quantiﬁer 
enough （pp. 110-111）. Notice that in （12） and （13） below, both ø and enough appear to select a 
noun phrase headed by a plural count noun poems or by a mass noun poetry, but not by a singular 
count noun poem: 
（12）a. I wrote ø poems.         （13） a. I’ve read enough poems.
 b. I wrote ø poetry.    b. I’ve read enough poetry.
 c. *I wrote ø poem.    c. *I’ve read enough poem.
He thus concludes that “deﬁnite expressions （like the president and John） are DPs headed by an 
overt or null determiner, whereas indeﬁnite expressions （like an apple and cheese） are QPs headed 
by an overt or null quantiﬁer” （p. 111）.
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At this point, a question naturally arises as to why （14a） below is grammatical.
（14）a. Those eggs and many dairy products cause cholesterol.
 b. [DP those eggs] and [QP many dairy products]
If D and Q were distinct categories, as R suggests they are, it would be a mystery why the coordina-
tion in （14b） was possible at all.
For the general purpose of an introductory syntax textbook, therefore, it seems inappropriate 
to make the D/Q distinction so explicitly. In this regard, we should note how R treats pronouns. 
English has basically two types of pronoun, namely, （i） ordinary personal pronouns, such as I, 
you, they, etc., which are deﬁnite expressions, and （ii） indeﬁnite pronouns like everybody, anyone, 
no one, etc. Interestingly, R treats these two types equally by giving them the same category label, 
PRN （which stands for “pronoun”）. This is a sensible thing to do, since the two types of pronoun 
actually behave almost identically, at least as far as their syntax is concerned. After all, extensive 
discussion of any semantic difference between them seems out of place in an introductory syntax 
textbook.4 So why not do the same with determiners and quantiﬁers?
In my teaching experience, making this （unnecessary） distinction has actually confused 
many students. Consider the following fact. R says that “bare indeﬁnite noun expressions （like 
toast and eggs） are QPs headed by a null quantiﬁer which is generic or partitive in interpretation” 
（p. 111）. These two interpretations associated with the null quantiﬁer actually correspond to the 
“generic” and “existential” interpretations discussed in Abbott 2006:
（15）（= Abbott’s （26b））: generic interpretation 
 Water with fluoride in it is good for the teeth.
（16）（= Abbott’s （27b）: existential interpretation
 There was water with fluoride in it in the test tube.
It is generally assumed that existential construction with there, such as （16）, is a diagnostic for 
indeﬁnite expressions. Therefore, the fact that water with fluoride in it in （16） cannot receive ge-
neric interpretation suggests that the same expression in （15）, which receives generic interpreta-
tion, must be a deﬁnite expression. Indeed, R himself presents what he calls the “Indeﬁniteness 
Condition,” which also suggests that existential construction can be used as a test for indeﬁniteness:
（17）（R’s （32ii）, p. 254）
 Indefiniteness Condition
 Expletive there can only be merged with a verb which has an indeﬁnite nominal 
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 or pronominal internal argument.5
We are led to the deﬁnite status of water with fluoride in it in （15） by （17） as well.
In fact, in French, water with fluoride in it in （15） does appear with a deﬁnite determiner:
（18）（= Abbott’s （35b））
 L’eau au fluor est bonne pour les dents.
So, if R’s argument for the DP status of John using the Greek example in （8） is legitimate, it should 
be concluded that water with fluoride in it in （15） must be headed by a null determiner too, not by 
a null quantiﬁer with generic meaning.
Then, are all bare English nominals with generic meaning DPs? This question is difﬁcult to 
answer; indeed, it seems too difﬁcult for an introductory syntax textbook. Consider, for example, 
（19a,b）, both of which involve a very innocent looking bare nominal linguistics.
（19）a. Linguistics is my favorite subject.
 b. How much linguistics do you already know?
Imagine you want to have your students draw a tree diagram of （19a）. Should linguistics be headed 
by Q or D? Since it is a noun that can be preceded by an overt quantiﬁer like much, as in （19b）, is it 
preceded by a null quantiﬁer （with generic meaning） in （19a）, too? Some may say yes. However, 
I don’t see any difference between linguistics in （19a） and, say, John in （20） below in terms of 
deﬁniteness.
（20）John is my favorite student.
R would analyze this John as having the structure of [DP ø John], as we have already seen. But then, 
linguistics too should be a DP, since, after all, it is a （subject） name, and as such, it must be a deﬁ-
nite expression.
All this complication wouldn’t arise if the D/Q distinction weren’t made in the ﬁrst place, 
with D subsuming Q under it as an umbrella category label. And I believe this kind of pedagogical 
care should have been taken in IESS.
2.3. Wh-Phrases
As was pointed out in section 2.2, it is reasonable that R uses the label PRN for both （deﬁ-
nite） personal pronouns like he, she, they, etc. and indeﬁnite pronouns like somebody, nobody, 
everyone, etc. After all, these two types of pronoun can be successfully coordinated:
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（21）[He and someone] went to the movies. （cf. （14））
Interrogative pronouns like what, which, who, etc. should be treated in the same way, because they 
are also pronouns, and they have the same syntactic distribution （before wh-movement） as per-
sonal and indeﬁnite pronouns:
（22）a. He danced.
 b. Someone danced.
 
  c. Who danced? (i.e. [CP _ [TP who danced]]) 
In fact, R analyzes who in Who was she dating? as PRN, but writes: “… it should be noted that 
interrogative pronouns like who are pronominal quantiﬁers and hence Q-pronouns, and so who 
could alternatively be assigned to the category Q” （p. 153）. This is true, because, unlike personal 
pronouns and indeﬁnite pronouns, some interrogative pronouns can take a nominal complement, a 
characteristic of D/Q as a head. Compare （23a） and （23b） in this respect.
（23）a. Which do you like better, syntax or semantics?
 b. Which assignment have you done? （= R’s （37c）, p. 165）
In （23a）, which stands alone as a constituent, so it’s natural that it should be assigned to the cat-
egory PRN. On the other hand, which assignment in （23b） should be analyzed as QP, as in （24a） 
below, since the alternative analysis, namely, PRNP in （24b） would be very awkward.
（24）a. QP    b.  PRNP
   Q  N    PRN   N 
which  assignment   which  assignment 
A pronoun always replaces a full-fledged nominal phrase, suggesting that it’s a maximal projection. 
Therefore, the analysis in （24b）, where a pronoun which heads a “pronoun phrase,” is theoretically 
unmotivated.
Although R doesn’t say much about this matter （except for what was noted in endnote 4）, he 
nevertheless uses a convention of giving the label PRN to single interrogative pronouns and Q to 
those that take a nominal complement.
From a pedagogical point of view, however, the QP in （24a） should just be a DP. This, for 
two reasons. （i） It’s possible to coordinate a phrase like which assignment and a full-fledged DP 
like the project name; notice that （25） is syntactically well formed.
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（25）[The project name] and [which assignment] have you forgotten to include in your 
 report?
（ii） It’s difﬁcult to decide whether wh-expressions like whose car are deﬁnite or indeﬁnite. Intui-
tively, whose car seems to be on a par with other interrogative expressions, such as [QP which bicycle], 
in terms of indeﬁniteness. Look at the following sentence, which is also syntactically well formed.
（26）[Which bicycle] and [whose car] did the thief steal?
Successful coordination in （26） does suggest that whose car is an indeﬁnite expression, according 
to R’s previous argument for the null quantiﬁer, using （10）. Then, whose car must be a QP.
And yet, R claims otherwise. He writes: “whose car is deﬁnite in interpretation （in the sense 
that it has a meaning paraphrasable as ‘the car belonging to who?’）, suggesting that it must be a DP 
headed by a deﬁnite determiner （and indeed there are a number of languages which have a type of 
possessive structure paraphrasable in English as whose the car – e.g. Hungarian）” （p. 169）. So R 
analyzes the structure of whose car as follows:
（27） DP
  PRN    D'
  whose D    N 
    ø    car
The placement of whose in a spec position, as in （27）, is reasonable, since, as R notes, whose 
itself carries genitive case independently of the containing phrase whose car, which carries accusa-
tive case in （26）. R then writes, “Moreover, whose in [（27）] can be substituted by a phrasal geni-
tive （as in ‘Which of the men’s car did you borrow?’）; and since phrases can occupy the speciﬁer 
（but not the head） position within a projection, it seems more likely that genitives are the speci-
ﬁers of the expressions containing them” （p. 169）.
However, the deﬁnite status of （27） doesn’t seem so straightforward. If R were right, some 
student’s dog, for example, would also be a DP with the following structure, since it may be para-
phrased as ‘the dog belonging to some student’:
（28） DP
   QP    D'
  Q  N  D  N 
  some student's  ø  dog 
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However, this phrase satisﬁes the Indeﬁniteness Condition in （17） above, suggesting that it is an 
indeﬁnite expression:
（29）（adapted from （1a） in Abbott 2014）
 There was some student’s dog in the yard.
Then, some student’s dog must be headed by a null quantiﬁer, not a null determiner.
In contrast, expressions like Mary’s dog does seem to be a deﬁnite expression, since it cannot 
be used in an existential sentence:
（30）（adapted from （2b） in Abbott 2014）
 *There was Mary’s dog in the yard.
So Mary’s dog must be a DP, with an internal structure along the lines of （31）.
（31） DP
   DP    D'
  D  N  D  N 
  ø Mary's  ø  dog 
   
From these facts, Abbott （2014） concludes that the （in）deﬁniteness of the genitive phrase is 
transferred to the expression that contains it.6 If Abbott is right, some student’s dog must be a QP 
（or gains a QP status after the transfer of indeﬁniteness from some student’s）, despite the fact that 
it may be paraphrased as ‘the dog belonging to some student.’7 Then, whose car in （27） must also 
be a QP, since whose, being an interrogative pronoun, is an indeﬁnite expression, and its indeﬁnite-
ness must be transferred to the nominal expression that contains it.
Can we now conclude Mary’s dog is a DP, since Mary’s is deﬁnite, whereas some student’s 
dog and whose car are QPs, since some （student’s） and whose are indeﬁnite? Well, there are still 
more complications. There are quantiﬁers that fail to meet R’s Indeﬁniteness Condition （17）; look 
at （32）, which is an ungrammatical existential sentence.
（32）（adapted from （2b） in Abbott 2014）
 *There was each/every/neither dog in the yard.
  
Does this mean each, every, and neither are deﬁnite expressions, since they fail the indeﬁniteness 
test? Are they, therefore, determiners? But semantically, they are deﬁnitely quantiﬁers.
Again, all this complication can be avoided if the D/Q distinction isn’t made in the ﬁrst place. 
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In other words, we should go back to the convention of Radford 1988, where there was a single 
category D for both determiners and quantiﬁers. We will still have unsolved problems like （32）, but 
strictly speaking, （32） is a semantic, not syntactic, issue. （So it should be given #, not *.）
In any case, since IESS is meant for readers with “little or no prior background in syntax” 
（back cover of IESS）, it seems more appropriate to keep the old convention of using D for both 
D and Q. 
2.4. Personal Pronouns as Determiners
Personal pronouns in English are said to form a closed class, since new words cannot be 
added to this class of nouns. Therefore, it doesn’t seem utterly preposterous to imagine that they 
may be determiners （which also form a closed class）. Indeed, R contends that they are and analyzes 
expressions such as we linguists in （33） as having the internal structure illustrated in （34）.
（33）（= R’s （80a）, p. 109）
 We linguists take ourselves/*yourselves/*themselves too seriously, don’t we/*you/*they?
（34） DP
  D  N 
  we linguists
This analysis seems to well explain the fact that we linguists cannot serve as an antecedent for your-
selves or themselves in （33）. Since we linguists is an expression headed by the ﬁrst-person plural 
determiner we, it can only serve as an antecedent for the ﬁrst-person plural anaphor ourselves. For 
the same reason, only we is allowed in the tag part of （33）, which is a tag question. Thus, R goes on 
to write: “More generally, we can conclude that all deﬁnite referring expressions are D-expressions: 
thus, an expression such as the chairman is a DP headed by the overt determiner the; a name/proper 
noun such as John is a DP headed by a null determiner; and a deﬁnite pronoun such as he is a pro-
nominal D constituent （or a D-pronoun）” （p. 110）. In short, we linguists is argued to be structur-
ally identical to the chairman and John, whose structures are given in （35）.
（35） DP     DP
  D  N   D  N 
  the chairman  ø  John 
In order for this argument to ﬁrmly stand, however, R needs to show that we linguists is not 
a result of apposition, which he fails to do. In this connection, look at the following examples of 
apposition from Huddleston and Pullum （henceforth, H and P） 2005:
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（36）（= H and P’s （38iii）, p. 96）
 a. the opera ‘Carmen’
 b. my wife Lucy
 c. our friend the mayor
According to H and P, Carmen, Lucy, and the mayor are appositive NP modiﬁers for the opera, my 
wife, and our friend, respectively, and they are “distinguished from the non-appositive ones by their 
ability to stand alone in place of the whole NP: instead of They invited my wife Lucy we could have 
simply They invited Lucy” （H and P, p. 96）.8 In this respect, linguists in we linguists does seem to 
be an appositive NP modiﬁer in the sense of H and P; observe （37）.
（37）a. We linguists don’t trust you politicians.
 b. We don’t trust you.
 c. Linguists don’t trust politicians.
Suppose that linguists and politicians in （37a） are appositive modiﬁers and that they modify we and 
you, respectively. Then, the grammaticality of （37b） will easily be explained, since linguists and 
politicians are modiﬁers （i.e. adjuncts） and therefore they are omissible. Furthermore, the gram-
maticality of （37c） readily follows, too; since linguists and politicians are appositive NP modiﬁers, 
they can stand alone. （Furthermore, the facts about anaphor-binding and choice of a pronoun in the 
tag in （33） also follow naturally.）
These facts might be explained by R’s DP analysis of we linguists in （34） as well, but only 
to a limited extent. Complements of some determiners are omissible （e.g. [DP These [N books]] are 
mine vs. [D These] are mine）, so we could say linguists and politicians, which are complements of 
we and you respectively, are omitted in （37b）. As for （37c）, R would say linguists and politicians 
are headed by a null quantiﬁer ø; see section 2.2.
But notice that expressions like [DP the chairman] and [DP ø John] can be used as appositive 
NP modiﬁers as well:
（38）a. [our friend] [the chairman] （cf. （36c））
 b. [my husband] [ø John] （cf. （36b））
However, R’s [DP we linguists] and [DP you politicians] cannot be used in this way:
（39）a. *[your students] [we linguists]  
 b. *[our teachers] [you politicians]
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This would be puzzling if we linguists, you politicians, the chairman, and John all had the same DP 
structure, as was suggested in （34） and （35）. In contrast, if we linguists and you politicians are in-
stances of apposition, the ungrammaticality of （39a,b） will immediately follow; since we linguists 
and you politicians are already appositive nominal phrases, forcing them to function as appositive 
modiﬁers for other noun expressions would result in “double apposition,” which apparently isn’t 
permissible.
Thus, until this apposition analysis is shown to be false, R’s DP analysis in （34） cannot be 
taken at face value. If so, from a pedagogical point of view again, perhaps, such a radical hypothesis 
as “personal pronouns = determiners” shouldn’t be introduced in introductory textbooks of syntax.
3. Wh-Questions
In this section, we turn to major theoretical devices that are used in deriving wh-questions in 
IESS. They include the Interrogative Condition, the Freezing Constraint, the Impenetrability Condi-
tion, the Attract Smallest Condition, and the edge feature. It will be shown that some of these are 
redundant while others ad hoc.
Pied-piping and preposition stranding in wh-questions are said to be explained well by R’s 
mechanism that consists of these devices. Upon scrutiny, however, this is shown not to be the case. 
In what follows, serious problems are pointed out, especially by looking at facts about passivization. 
Other related issues are also discussed.
3.1 Force vs. Type
R explains the difference between declarative and interrogative clause in terms of different 
features carried by different complementizers. Look at （40）.
（40）（= R’s （42）, p. 97）
 a. We didn’t know [if he had resigned].
 b. We didn’t know [that he had resigned].
 c. We didn’t know [he had resigned].
Regarding these sentences, R writes the following （p. 97）:
The bracketed complement clause is interpreted as interrogative in force in [（40a）] and de-
clarative in force in [（40b）], and it is plausible to suppose that the force of the clause is deter-
mined by a force feature carried by the italicized complementizer introducing the clause: in 
other words, the bracketed clause is interrogative in force in [（40a）] because it is introduced 
by the interrogative complementizer if, and is declarative in force in [（40b）] because it is 
introduced by the declarative complementizer that.
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　… and in [（40c）], it is a CP headed by a null variant of the declarative complementizer that 
and so is likewise declarative in force. More generally, the null complementizer analysis 
would enable us to arrive at a uniform characterization of all ﬁnite clauses as CPs in which 
the force of a clause is indicated by the force feature carried by an （overt or null） comple-
mentizer introducing the clause. 
This much is straightforward. Therefore, it becomes very puzzling when R introduces the notion of 
“clause typing” （Cheng 1997）. In this connection, consider the derivation of Who was she dating. 
（41）, which is R’s （3） on p. 153, is the derivation he provides for this sentence.
（41）
Regarding （41）, R writes, “… every clause/CP must be typed （i.e. identiﬁed as declarative or in-
terrogative, or exclamative etc. in type） in the syntax, and that a clause is typed as interrogative if 
it contains an interrogative head or speciﬁer: on this view, movement of the interrogative pronoun 
who to spec-C serves to type the CP in [（41）] as interrogative” （p. 154）.
How can this be? Notice that the C head position of （41） is occupied by a “strong null inter-
rogative complementizer” （p. 122）, which carries an interrogative force just as if does. Then, the 
CP is already “typed” as interrogative, so the movement of who seems totally redundant if it is 
indeed to type the clause as interrogative. 
And yet, R considers this wh-movement to be an important condition imposed on questions 
in general and proposes （42） below.
（42）Interrogative Condition　（= R’s （24）, p. 161）
  A clause is interpreted as a non-echoic question if （and only if） it is a CP with an inter-
rogative speciﬁer （i.e. a speciﬁer containing an interrogative word）.
In accordance with （42）, he goes on to argue that even yes/no questions have a ﬁlled spec-C; for 
example, he suggests that （43a） has the structure in （43b）.
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（43）（adapted from R’s （36）, p. 165）
 a. Is it raining?
 b. [CP whether is [TP it raining] 
9
Notice that （43a） doesn’t have anything overt in its spec-C position; if the position were really 
empty, it would violate （42）, which should make the sentence ungrammatical, contrary to fact. But 
if we assume that there is a “null yes-no question particle （= a null counterpart of the adverb wheth-
er）” （p. 164） there, as in （43b）, we can make the grammaticality of （43a） follow from  （42）. 
（And R presents evidence for whether from Elizabethan English as well as present-day English.） 
Thus, in R’s model of syntax, （42） plays an important role in explaining syntax of questions. 
In addition to the redundancy noted above, however, （42） also faces another problem, which 
we now turn to. But ﬁrst, let’s note that comp-to-comp movement of a wh-phrase is motivated by 
R’s Impenetrability Condition: 
（44）Impenetrability Condition  （= R’s （72）, p. 107）
  A constituent in the domain of （i.e. c-commanded by） a complementizer is impenetrable 
to （and so cannot be attracted by） a higher head c-commanding the relevant comple-
mentizer.
In IESS, R originally introduces this condition in order to explain why extraction of subject is al-
lowed from a defective （i.e. exceptional） clause, but not from a CP:
（45）（adapted from R’s （70a）, p. 106）
 a. He is believed to be innocent.
 b. [He is believed [TP he to be innocent]]
（46）（adapted from R’s （74b）, p. 107）
 a. *John was wanted to apologize.
 b. [John was wanted [CP for [TP John to apologize]]]
Passivization of he is possible in （45）, since there is no complementizer in the embedded clause （= 
defective clause）, whereas that of John in （46） is blocked by the null inﬁnitival complementizer 
for. （44） certainly captures these facts.
（44） is also said to apply to long distance wh-movement; look at （47）.
（47）（adapted from R’s （57） and （60）, p. 175）
 a. What might he think that she is hiding what?
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  b. [CP __ might he think [CP __ [C' that she is hiding what]]] 
    (b)   (a)
One-fell-swoop movement of what in （47a） would violate （44）, since there is a complementizer 
that in the embedded clause. However, this complementizer is said to come with an “edge feature” 
（p. 161） or [EF], which attracts what to its spec position. （[EF] is discussed extensively in section 
3.3.） The movement thus motivated, i.e. （a） in （47b）, is permissible, because it doesn’t target a 
higher head that c-commands the complementizer that. Since the matrix C is also assumed to carry 
[EF], what, which is no longer in the c-command domain of that after movement （a）, is further 
attracted by the matrix C （= movement （b） in （47b））, resulting in a comp-to-comp movement.
But there is a problem in this derivation, since syntactic operations are said to operate in a 
“bottom-up” （p. 139） fashion. （48） below indicates a stage where think and the embedded CP, in 
which what has already moved up to spec-C, are about to be merged.
（48）think + [CP what that she is hiding what]
However, in light of （42）, coupled with the assumption that wh-movement serves to type a clause 
interrogative, this merger shouldn’t be possible. This is because the CP in （48） would then be inter-
preted as an interrogative clause with what in spec-C. But think doesn’t take an interrogative clause 
as its complement, as is clear from sentences like （49）.
（49）*I think what she is hiding.　（cf. I wonder what she is hiding.）
One might object to this criticism by saying that the resulting structure from the merger in 
（48） is only a temporal structure （i.e. not a ﬁnal product） and therefore it doesn’t get sent to LF, 
where the interpretating of the sentence is carried out. So the CP in （48） isn’t regarded as interroga-
tive when it is merged with think.
Then, let’s look at what is actually sent to LF, namely, the structure in （50） below. Does it 
make any difference?
（50）[CP what might he think [CP  what that she is hiding what]]
Notice that there is a deleted copy of what in the embedded spec-C （in addition to the original copy 
in the complement position of hiding） in （50）. For R, deletion is an operation by which “phono-
logical features are given a null spellout and so are unpronounced” （p. 124）. So, as far as syntax 
is concerned, what in the embedded spec-C is very much present, just as null complementizers like 
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that and for are. Therefore, the Interrogative Condition should make the embedded CP in （50） inter-
rogative, rendering the sentence ungrammatical, just as （49） is. However, the sentence in （47a） is, 
of course, impeccable. Thus, the Interrogative Condition, as long as it is motivated by the need to 
type clauses interrogative, seems untenable and needs to be revised （or abandoned; see section 3.2）.
3.2. Motivation for Wh-Movement
In addition to the problem pointed out in section 3.1, the Interrogative Condition also seems 
superfluous in light of the Freezing Constraint, which R adopts from Rizzi and Shlonsky 2005:
（51）Freezing Constraint　（= R’s （75）, p. 181）
  An element moved to a position dedicated to some scope-discourse interpretive property 
… is frozen in place.
Regarding （51）, R writes （pp. 181-182）:
  If we assume that the speciﬁer position of an interrogative C is the scope position for 
a moved interrogative expression （marking the fact that it has scope over all the con-
stituents that it c-commands, hence over all the other constituents of the clause）, then 
（in the case of interrogatives） [（51）] amounts to claiming that once an interrogative 
wh-expression moves into the speciﬁer position of an interrogative complementizer, it 
immediately becomes frozen in place and is unable to move further.
Actually, since interrogative wh-expressions must indicate their scope, （51） is more like a reason 
for, rather than a constraint on, wh-movement in English. In this connection, look at the following 
wh-questions from Japanese:
（52）a. Taro-wa [CP Mary-ga   nani-o   tabeta       ka]      siranai.
    TOP         Nom what-Acc ate       C      know.not
    ‘Taro doesn’t know what Mary ate.’
 b. Taro-wa [CP Mary-ga nani-o tabeta to] iimasita           ka.
       C said           C
    ‘What did Taro say that Mary ate?’
In Japanese, which is a head-last language, overt wh-movement is unnecessary, since it has an inter-
rogative complementizer ka, which independently indicates scope for wh-expressions. In （52a）, ka 
heads the embedded clause and therefore nani ‘what’ is understood to take scope over that clause. 
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Indeed, the sentence is interpreted as a statement containing an （indirect） question. On the other 
hand, ka heads the matrix clause in （52b）, whose embedded clause is headed by to, a Japanese 
counterpart to the declarative complementizer that in English. Since to isn’t a scope indicator, nani 
relies on ka in the matrix clause for scope indication. Thus, nani is understood to take scope over 
the matrix clause, so （52b） is interpreted as a direct wh-question.
What should be noted at this juncture is the fact that interrogative wh-expressions in Japanese 
cannot be used without a scope indicator, namely, ka, as the ungrammaticality of （53a） shows.
（53）a. *Taro-wa [CP Mary-ga nani-o tabeta to] iimasita.
 b. *Taro said Mary ate what.
（53b） is the English equivalent to （53a）. Scope indication thus seems mandatory in wh-questions, 
and if so, it doesn’t seem so outrageous to assume that wh-movement is motivated for this particu-
lar reason in English, a language that lacks overt scope indicators. Indeed, （53b）, in which wh-
movement （i.e. scope indication） is missing, is ungrammatical, if the sentence is to be interpreted 
as a non-echoic question.
If scope indication is the reason for wh-movement, however, the derivation of （47a） in sec-
tion 3.1 must be along the lines of （54） below.
（54）  [CP _ might he think [CP that she is hiding what]]
      
In （54）, what doesn’t stop at the embedded spec-C on its way to the matrix spec-C, since the em-
bedded CP is not headed by an interrogative C; hence, the embedded spec-C is not a scope position, 
according to R’s assumption that the speciﬁer position of an interrogative C is the scope position 
for a moved interrogative expression. Then, there is no reason for what to move into that position.
There is a nice consequence to this one-fell-swoop movement analysis. Since what doesn’t 
move to the embedded spec-C, the problem that we noted with （48）, which is repeated below as 
（55）, doesn’t arise. Instead, think is now viewed to merge with a declarative CP, as illustrated in 
（56）.10
（55）think + [CP what that she is hiding what]
（56）think + [CP that she is hiding what]
We already know that there is no way to solve problems associated with （55） in R’s model, which 
crucially relies on the Impenetrability Condition and the Interrogative Condition. The former condi-
tion forces what to move to the embedded spec-C, and the latter makes the embedded clause thus 
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formed interrogative. But think doesn’t take an interrogative clause as its complement, so the deri-
vation should crash, contrary to fact. The alternative analysis in （54）, therefore, seems superior to 
R’s, in which wh-scope is viewed only as a constraint on wh-movement, not its motivation.
If the analysis in （54） is on the right track, there are two things that can/should be said at this 
point. First, the Interrogative Condition in （42） is superfluous, since wh-movement in wh-questions 
is always driven by an interrogative C for scope reasons. This C automatically guarantees that the 
clause it heads is a question, so we don’t need （42）, which was motivated by the need to type 
clauses interrogative. Second, validity of the Impenetrability Condition should be reexamined, since 
it isn’t compatible with the analysis in （54）, which, otherwise, looks theoretically well founded. 
And this is what we undertake in the next subsection.
3.3. Edge Feature
The rationale for wh-movement in R’s model of syntax is to type clauses interrogative. How-
ever, the actual trigger for this movement is stipulated to be an edge feature, or [EF]. In order to 
characterize [EF], R mentions Chomsky, who “maintains that just as T in ﬁnite clauses carries an 
EPP feature requiring it to be extended into a TP projection containing a speciﬁer on the edge of TP, 
so too C in questions carries an edge feature [EF] requiring it to be extended into a CP projection 
containing a speciﬁer on the edge of CP” （p. 161）.
What should be noted about [EF] at this point is that unlike [EPP], which “works in conjunc-
tion with agreement （so that T requires as its subject a constituent which it agrees with in person/
number）, … the edge feature on C operates independently of agreement, allowing C （in principle） 
to attract any type of constituent to move to the speciﬁer position within CP” （p. 161）. This means 
wh-movement in interrogative sentences that we saw in section 3.2 is not carried out for satisfaction 
of the Interrogative Condition per se, which could be translated as a requirement of agreement in 
terms of an interrogative feature. （For that matter, it can’t be for scope indication, or agreement in 
terms of a scope feature, either.） Violation of the Interrogative Condition is viewed only as a conse-
quence of failing to satisfy [EF]’s （syntactic） need to create a speciﬁer.
But there is a serious problem with this characterization of [EF]; that is, its distribution, which 
is not speciﬁed at all in IESS, seems totally ad hoc. This problem directly stems from the Impenetra-
bility Condition in （44）, repeated here as （57）.
（57）Impenetrability Condition
  A constituent in the domain of （i.e. c-commanded by） a complementizer is impenetrable 
to （and so cannot be attracted by） a higher head c-commanding the relevant comple-
mentizer.
Recall that the derivation of What might he think that she is hiding? was analyzed as （47b）, re-
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peated below as （58）.
（58）  [CP __ might he think [CP __ [C' that she is hiding what]]]
    (b)    (a)
The movement of what to the embedded spec-C is said to be triggered by the [EF] on the embedded 
complementizer that. After the movement to satisfy this feature, what is no longer in the c-command 
domain of that, as shown in （59）, and so is stipulated to be free to move further.
（59） CP
  what  C'
   C  TP
   that she is hiding what
It is widely assumed that all instances of T come with [EPP]; thus, every sentence is guar-
anteed to have a subject. However, not all instances of C can possess [EF]. This is so, because, 
otherwise, a passive sentence like *John was wanted to apologize in （46a） couldn’t be explained as 
a violation of the Impenetrability Condition, which is what R presents as the reason for the ungram-
maticality of the sentence; look again at the analysis in （46b）, repeated here as （60）.
（60）[John was wanted [CP for [TP John to apologize]]]
In （60）, John originates in the subject position of the embedded clause, which is headed by a null 
complementizer for. This state of affairs is illustrated in （61） below. Notice that John is in the c-
command domain of the complementizer for and therefore it is not allowed to move out of the em-
bedded clause. （Recall that the grammaticality of He is believed [to be innocent] in （45） is taken 
as evidence to show that there is no complementizer in the embedded clause of this sentence, which 
is R’s rationale for the postulation of defective clause.）
（61） CP
  C  TP
  for DP  T'
   John T  V 
    to apologize 
But why can’t this complementizer possess [EF]? Let’s suppose it did. Then, John would 
move into the spec of for, and from that position, it would be able to move up to the subject position 
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of the matrix clause; notice that it is no longer in the c-command domain of the complementizer in 
（62）.
（62） CP
  DP  C'
John C  TP
   for DP  T'
  John T  V 
     to apologize 
However, this derivation shouldn’t be available, since （46a） is ungrammatical. A natural question 
that arises at this point is, what prevents this complementizer from having [EF]? R fails to ask this 
question, much less provide an answer to it. But without a systematic explanation of its distribution, 
the notion of [EF] can’t avoid looking ad hoc. This in turn casts doubt on the validity of the Impen-
etrability Condition as well, since it always works in tandem with [EF].11
3.4. Pied-Piping and Preposition Stranding
Triggering movement operations by way of [EF], coupled with the Impenetrability Condi-
tion, looks dubious from the viewpoint of preposition stranding as well. First, look at the following 
sentences:
 （63） a. They asked [to whom he was referring]. （= R’s （49）, p. 171）
  b. They asked [who he was referring to]. （= R’s （52）, p. 173）
According to R, who assumes that formal and informal English have different grammars, （63a） is 
generated by the grammar of formal English, whereas （63b） by that of informal English. In （63a）, 
whom undergoes wh-movement along with to from the complement position of referring, since this 
preposition is stipulated to lack [EF] in formal English.
 （64） PP
  P  PRN
  to  whom
Notice that to c-commands whom in （64）; noting this, R goes on to suggest that whom cannot move 
out of the PP because of the preposition to, which he takes to function on a par with a complemen-




（65）（= R’s （51）, p. 172）
 Impenetrability Condition
  A constituent in the domain of a complementizer or preposition is impenetrable to （and 
so cannot be attracted by） a higher head c-commanding the relevant complementizer/
preposition.
Thus, the impossibility of movement of whom out of the PP in （64） is now explained by the （new） 
Impenetrability Condition. In （63a）, therefore, when whom moves, to is necessarily pied-piped, 
which is in accordance with R’s Attract Smallest Condition or ASC:
（66）（= R’s （41）, p. 167）
 Attract Smallest Condition/ASC
  A head which attracts a particular type of item attracts the smallest constituent contain-
ing such an item which will not lead to violation of any UG principle.
Notice that the PP to whom is the next smallest constituent containing whom, after whom itself. 
Thus, （63a） is derived.
In contrast to formal English, to in informal （63b） is stipulated to come with [EF] in R’s 
model. Thus, who is forced to move to the spec position of to, where it becomes free from （65） and 
so can move further. This state of affairs is illustrated in （67）.
（67） PP
  PRN  P'
  who P  PRN
   to  who
Therefore, in environments where pied-piping is observed in formal English, the grammar of infor-
mal English generates interrogative sentences with a preposition always stranded.
Since prescriptive grammar often stipulates that “a sentence should not end with a preposi-
tion” （Blake 2008, p. 98）, it is perhaps reasonable to suggest that preposition stranding is a charac-
teristic of informal English. And yet, we immediately encounter problems when we turn to passive 
sentences. In this connection, consider （68）:
（68）（adapted from （85a,b） in Radford 1988, p. 428） 
 a. Everybody stared at Mary.
 b. Mary was stared at （by everybody）.
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Since stared at in （68a） is a “prepositional verb” （Radford 1988）, it has the structure along the 
lines of （69）.
（69） VP
  V  PP
stared P  DP
   at   Mary
Notice that （68b） contains a stranded preposition; hence, it must be an informal sentence. If so, at 
must come with [EF], which in turn triggers movement of Mary into its spec position. Owing to this 
movement, Mary comes to the edge of the PP, as in （70） below, and is free to move further from 
that position without violating （65）.
（70） PP
  DP  P'
Mary P  DP
   at  Mary
And this is how （68b） is derived.12
How about formal English? It is debatable whether （68b） is generable only by the grammar 
of informal English. This is so because a formal counterpart with pied-piping is ungrammatical:
（71）*At Mary was stared （by everybody）.
For that matter, given the assumption that prepositions don’t come with [EF] in formal English, 
passive sentences involving prepositional verbs cannot exist at all in this variety of English, where 
pied-piping is always forced by （66）. This conclusion seems very unlikely, and to the extent that it 
is so, the stipulation that prepositions come with [EF] only in informal English becomes doubtful 
as well.
But what is wrong with （71）? Let’s examine its derivation closely. Suppose, as R does, that 
at doesn’t come with [EF], since the sentence is from formal English. Suppose also that R’s revised 
Impenetrability Condition in （65） is on the right track. Then, Mary cannot be extracted from the PP 
at Mary. Thus, in accordance with （66）, the next smallest constituent containing Mary, namely, the 
PP at Mary, is chosen for movement to spec-T. Is there anything wrong with this movement opera-




  _  T'
   T  PASSP
   Af PASS VP
    was V  PP
    stared P  DP
      at  Mary
Reall that a similar PP in （63a） does move without causing any problems.
One might suggest that the movement of at Mary is illicit because PPs can’t become subjects. 
Since （72） is a ﬁnite clause, its subject is supposed to receive nominative case; however, unlike 
DPs/QPs, PPs don’t require case. Now, is this why （71） is ungrammatical? That is, is it the case that 
at Mary can’t be attracted by T, since it doesn’t need case?
The answer must be negative. First of all, the movement in （72） is motivated by [EPP] on T, 
not by the PP’s need to get case. Second, PPs can be subjects of ﬁnite clauses, whether they require 
case or not; this can be seen by full grammaticality of sentences like （73） below.
（73）[PP Under the table] is the best place to hide.
Then, we are left with only one other possibility; that is, the ASC in （66） must be wrong, since the 
ungrammatical sentence in （71） is the result of enforcing this condition.
Indeed, there is reason to suspect that （66） may be untenable if R’s description of McClo-
skey’s （2000） data from West Ulster English is correct. The following are the relevant sentences 
from this dialect of English:
（74）（= R’s （65）, p. 178）
 a. What all do you think that he’ll say that we should buy?
 b. What do you think all that he’ll say that we should buy?
 c. What do you think that he’ll say all that we should buy?
 d. What do you think that he’ll say that we should buy all?
R uses （74） to argue for comp-to-comp nature of wh-movement. More speciﬁcally, he contends 
that what can move along with all or it can leave it behind in spec-C positions or the complement 
position of buy in the long-distance wh-movement in （74）. To see this clearly, look at the following 
schematic representation of （74）:
On the DP Hypothesis and Wh-Movement
39
（75）[CP3 _ [C3 do] you think [CP2 _ [C2 that] he’ll say [CP1 _ [C1 that] we should buy what all]
If what all as a unit moves all the way up to the spec-C of CP3, （74a） is obtained. If what leaves all 
behind in the spec-C of CP2, （74b） is obtained. If it leaves all behind in the spec-C of CP1, （74c） 
is obtained. If it leaves all behind in the complement position of buy, then （74d） is obtained.
However, in explaining the internal structure of what all, R writes: “The quantiﬁer all merges 
with its complement what to form the structure [all what]. The wh-word then raises to become the 
speciﬁer of all, forming the overt QP [what all]” （p. 178）. This is illustrated in （76）.
（76） QP
  PRN  Q'
  what Q  PRN
   all  what
But what motivates this movement? Although R doesn’t say, it’s reasonable to assume that 
it must be [EF]. Then, are （74b-d） all considered informal sentences in West Ulster English, since 
“Q-stranding” （cf. preposition stranding） is observed one way or another? For that matter, are there 
any formal varieties of West Ulster English in which all comes without [EF]? In other words, are 
there varieties in which All what do you think that he’ll say that we should buy? is grammatical? 
If not, why not? If all always comes with [EF], does that mean West Ulster English is intrinsically 
an informal language? R doesn’t raise these questions, but without systematic answers to them, the 
postulation of [EF] looks totally ad hoc, as was originally pointed out in section 3.3.
But a more devastating problem for R’s explanation of （74） is the following discrepancy. 
Given the internal structure of what all in （76）, movement of what pied-piping all in （74a-c） 
shouldn’t be allowed in the ﬁrst place. Notice that the relevant movement operation in （74） is 
wh-movement, so moving the smallest constituent containing a wh-expression, namely, just what, 
should sufﬁce for satisfaction of the edge features on the three Cs in （75）, as long as doing so 
doesn’t lead to violation of any UG principle. And it doesn’t, as the grammaticality of （74d） shows. 
In other words, if the ASC were an accurate condition, it wouldn’t allow the movement of [QP what 
all], since this QP is not the smallest constituent containing a wh-expression. But it does; otherwise, 
（74a-c） wouldn’t be generated. Hence, the validity of （66） is seriously doubted.
It is true that the fact in （74） is suggestive of comp-to-comp nature of wh-movement, pro-
vided that what and all indeed form a constituent underlyingly. This is debatable, however, although 
McCloskey seems to take it for granted. Given the nature of IESS as an （introductory） textbook, I 
would like to suggest that until solid evidence for the constituency of what all is ﬁrmly established, 
data like （74） shouldn’t be presented as support for comp-to-comp movement. In the meantime, 




To sum up, it seems premature to accept R’s way of explaining the phenomena of pied-piping 
and preposition stranding, which still leaves much to be desired at the moment.
4. Conclusion
Although I have presented quite a few problems associated with R’s model of syntax, most 
of them seem easily solvable by dropping （or revising） some ideas, such as the D/Q distinction and 
the Interrogative Condition.15 The effects of the Impenetrability Condition will probably be cap-
tured well by the good old case theory. As for wh-movement, it should be motivated by wh-phrase’s 
need to indicate scope, which will be just a minor revision of the Freezing Constraint. Perhaps, the 
edge feature shouldn’t be mentioned at all in introductory textbooks like IESS, since it can’t explain 
facts about pied-piping and preposition stranding straightforwardly. It is true that the concept of 
“phase” in Chapter 9 of IESS （which I didn’t discuss in the present article） won’t be understood 
without knowing how [EF] works. That may not be such a serious problem, however, since a semes-
ter is usually not enough to reach that （extremely technical） chapter, which is full of controversial 
issues of its own. In fact, Chapter 9 seems to be only for advanced students who are taking syntax 
as a major course in graduate school.
I still have a lot more to say about IESS, but space constraints force me to leave it for future 
occasions.
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Endnotes
1 Actually, things are a little more complicated. With ordinary verbs like know, the “clausemate condition” 
on any and its affective constituent in negative sentences does seem to hold generally. In fact, （i） below, 
in which didn’t and anything are not clausemates, is ungrammatical if anything is to be interpreted as a 
polarity item.
  （i） *I didn’t know he had stolen anything.
 Notice that （i） doesn’t mean the same thing as I knew he had stolen nothing, which is the meaning we 
would expect from （i） if anything were indeed a polarity item; see endnote 2.
However, with so-called “bridge verbs” （Stowell 1981）, such as say, think, believe, etc., the clause-
mate condition apparently loses force; notice that anything in （ii） is indeed a polarity item:
  （ii） I don’t think he knows anything. （= I think he knows nothing.）
 But these are special cases that seem to involve a certain syntactic operation （i.e. negative-raising） or 
verb semantics （i.e. nonfactive vs. factive predicates）, discussion of which is beyond the scope of an 
introductory textbook like IESS, so shouldn’t concern us at this time.
2 There is a simple test that we can apply to see whether a given instance of any in a negative sentence is a 
polarity item or not. If the sentence contains a polarity any, it can be rewritten with no, without changing 
its general meaning. Indeed, （i） below can be said to retain the basic meaning of （7a）:
  （i） She likes no students of syntax.
 In contrast, sentences with any as universal quantiﬁer cannot retain their meaning if rewritten with no:
  （ii） She likes syntax students of no persuasion.
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 （ii） doesn’t mean what （7b） with any interpreted as universal quantiﬁer does.
3 It’s true that this is only a description, not an explanation, of facts about polarity any in nominal phrases. 
That is, we still don’t know speciﬁcally why （7b） is ungrammatical if any is taken as a polarity item; 
notice that this any is c-commanded by an affective constituent, doesn’t, within the same clause. Finding 
an answer to this question, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
4 R writes on page 5: “… pronouns can be argued to belong to a number of distinct types of category, [but] 
in order to simplify discussion I shall simply refer to them as belonging to the category PRN throughout 
this book.”
5 What isn’t clear here is what R means by “an indeﬁnite nominal or pronominal internal argument.” Does 
“indeﬁnite” modify only “nominal,” or does it also modify “pronominal”? If the answer is the former, he 
directly contradicts himself when he argues that personal pronouns such as we are deﬁnite determiners 
（see section 2.4）. How can deﬁnite expressions meet the Indeﬁniteness Condition? If the answer is the 
latter, he again contradicts himself when he discusses on page 253 the following sentence from informal 
English.
  （i） There’s only me going to the party.
 He says the existential sentence in （i） is grammatical, but notice that me is not an indeﬁnite pronominal 
internal argument. Therefore, it should violate the Indeﬁniteness Condition, contrary to fact.
  The existential construction with there does seem to allow deﬁnite expressions, including per-
sonal pronouns, as internal argument; however, this possibility appears to be limited only to what Ab-
bott （2006） calls “list existential,” which typically lacks a locative PP after the internal argument. Since 
（i） may be paraphrased as There’s only me who’s going to the party, going to the party in （i） must be 
a post-nominal modiﬁer. This means that there is no locative expression following me going to the party 
and therefore （i） too qualiﬁes as list existential. So it seems best to remove “pronominal” from （17） and 
present it as a condition that applies only to ordinary existential sentences.
6 Abbott uses the notion weak vs. strong to distinguish expressions that can appear in existential sentences 
（= weak expressions） and those that cannot （= strong）.
7 Notice that facts like （29） and （30） may suggest correctness of the old X’-theoretic analysis of NPs, 
which places a and the in expressions like a dog and the dog in the speciﬁer position of the N dog. In 
fact, we could say that [NP a dog] becomes indeﬁnite and [NP the dog] deﬁnite owing to transfer of the 
（in）deﬁniteness of a/the in the speciﬁer position to the entire NP. If so, the indeﬁnite status of some 
student’s dog and the deﬁnite status of Mary’s dog would receive a natural explanation in terms of 
（in）deﬁniteness transfer, since some student’s and Mary’s would also be placed in the speciﬁer position of 
the N dog in X’-theory.
8 H and P don’t adopt the DP Hypothesis, so their NPs here are R’s DPs.
9 In this article, I will follow R’s convention of using strikethrough to indicate both categories that do not 
have phonological features and traces, which are considered copies whose phonological features have 
been deleted.
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10 As we noted earlier, R writes that the embedded clause of We didn’t know that he had resigned in （40b） 
is declarative, “because it is introduced by the declarative complementizer that” （p. 97）. However, he 
directly contradicts himself by presenting examples like the following from Belfast English （p. 154）:
  （i） I wonder [which dish that they picked].
  （ii） They didn’t know [which model that we had discussed].
 Notice that the bracketed clauses in （i） and （ii） are clearly interrogative clauses （i.e. indirect questions）, 
and yet they are headed by a declarative complementizer that. （According to R, Belfast English is not 
sensitive to his “Complementizer Condition,” which states that “[a]n overt complementizer （like that/
for/if） cannot have an overt speciﬁer in the superﬁcial structure of a sentence” （p. 154）; hence, unlike in 
Standard English, （i） and （ii） are grammatical in Belfast English. As for the CP in （55） from Standard 
English, it is said not to violate this condition, since （55） is “an intermediate stage of derivation, and the 
Complementizer Condition holds only of ﬁnal/superﬁcial syntactic structures” （p. 177）.）
  Data like （i） and （ii） may be accurate, but what are teachers supposed to do with them after tell-
ing students that that is a declarative complementizer? Besides, there are not many students, including 
native speakers of English, who are familiar with Belfast English, so these examples don’t seem to belong 
to introductory textbooks of English syntax, from a purely pedagogical point of view, at least.
11 The movement of John from spec-C in （62） to spec-T of the matrix clause would be considered “improp-
er movement” （Chomsky 1986）, since it’s a movement from an A’-position to an A-position. This would 
naturally explain why （46a） （i.e. （60）） is ungrammatical, so for in （62） may come with [EF] after all. 
However, there are still problems with [EF], which will become obvious when we examine derivation of 
sentences with preposition stranding; see endnote 12.
12  From the viewpoint of improper movement, which we saw in endnote 11, this derivation is actually prob-
lematic. The movement indicated in （70） is motivated by satisfaction of [EF] （on P）, just like ordinary 
wh-movement in （47）, as well as movement of a wh-phrase that results in preposition stranding, such as 
that in （67）. Therefore, the movement in （70） must also be A’-movement. Then, the succeeding move-
ment of Mary from spec-P （= A’-position） in （70） to spec-T （= A-position） will be improper movement 
and so shouldn’t be allowed. But the resulting sentence in （68b） is fully grammatical, further casting 
doubt on the credibility of [EF].
13 Here, R might want to resort to the analysis that he adopted in Radford 1988, namely, “reanalysis.” 
According to this analysis, the prepositional verb [stare [PP at Mary]] gets reanalyzed as a phrasal verb 
[stare-at [NP Mary]] when the sentence is passivized. Then, at and Mary cease to form a constituent, so the 
ungrammaticality of （71） seems to follow naturally.
  However, there is no empirical support for “reanalysis.” As Baltin and Postal （1996） show, the 
preposition of a prepositional verb behaves independently of the verb, even after passivization. In fact, the 
preposition may be coordinated with another preposition, as in （i）, or it can be shared by more than one 
prepositional verb, as in （ii）.
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  （i） The bridge was flown （both） over and under.
  （ii） Communism was talked, argued, and fought about.
 These sentences strongly argue against the phrasal verb status of fly over/fly under and talk about/argue 
about/ﬁght about. Therefore, stared at in （68） must also be a prepositional verb, just as （72） illustrates.
14  R actually claims that there are more pieces of evidence that suggest comp-to-comp nature of wh-move-
ment other than the data in （74）, namely, binding facts regarding expressions like which picture of himself 
in long distance wh-movement, the phenomenon called “wh-copying” in Child English （Thornton 1995）, 
and auxiliary inversion in embedded clauses in Belfast English （Henry 1995）. Because of space limita-
tions, however, I cannot discuss these in the present article.
15 One might object to dropping the D/Q distinction altogether by saying that the distinction is still needed 
when analyzing nominal phrases like all the books, in which Q and D co-occur. It is my stance, however, 
that detailed analysis of this kind of phrase is a topic for advanced syntax students, not for students tar-
geted by IESS.
